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Abstract: For a set-valued function F on a compact subset W of a
manifold, spanning is a topological property that implies that F (x) 6= ∅ for
interior points x of W . A myopic equilibrium applies when for each action
there is a payoff whose functional value is not necessarily affine in the strat-
egy space. We show that if the payoffs satisfy the spanning property, then
there exist a myopic equilibrium (though not necessarily a Nash equilibrium).
Furthermore, given a parametrized collection of games and the spanning
property to the structure of payoffs in that collection, the resulting myopic
equilibria and their payoffs have the spanning property with respect to that
parametrization. This is a far reaching extension of the Kohberg-Mertens
Structure Theorem. There are at least four useful applications, when payoffs
are exogenous to a finite game tree (for example a finitely repeated game fol-
lowed by an infinitely repeated game), when one wants to understand a game
strategically entirely with behaviour strategies, when one wants to extends
the subgame concept to subsets of a game tree that are known in common,
and for evolutionary game theory. The proofs involve new topological results
asserting that spanning is preserved by relevant operations on set-valued
functions.
1 Introduction
Conventionally with games payoffs are multilinear functions of the mixed
strategies, meaning that with finitely many pure strategies the payoffs can
be represented by multidimensional matrices. One can move away from a
multilinear relationship between mixed strategies and payoffs and still get
a Nash equilibrium. What counts is that the best reply correspondence of
each player in mixed strategies is a convex set, allowing one to apply fixed
point theory. If however the relationship between the mixed strategies of
a player and her payoffs is merely continuous, there may not be a Nash
equilibrium. For example, if the payoff function for a player is convex in her
mixed strategies, the best reply correspondence can generate disjoint sets,
and the result may be no Nash equilibria.
This lack of a Nash equilibrium can be rectified by expanding the concept
of what is a payoff for a player. Instead of associating a payoff to a mixed
strategy, one can associate a payoff to each pure strategy or action that the
player can use. This broadening of what is a payoff allows one to define a
new kind of equilibrium, called a myopic equilibrium. A myopic equilibrium
is defined, see (Simon, Spiez˙ and Torun´czyk (2020)), to be a strategy profile
such that each action used with positive probability by a player gives the
maximum payoff possible from the use of any action of that player. In the
context of multilinear payoffs, a myopic equilibrium is the same as a Nash
equilibrium. But even when the payoff functions are concave, the myopic
equilibria may be far from the Nash equilibria, as we will see in Example 1
below.
In the present paper, we consider parametrized relationships between the
mixed strategies and the payoffs, especially when that relationship satisfies
the spanning property (Simon, Spiez˙, Torun´czyk 2002). We show that if the
payoffs relative to a parametrization have the spanning property, then the
resulting parametrized myopic equilibria also have the spanning property.
This theory has multiple new applications.
First, myopic equilibria are equivalent to equilibria used in evolutionary
game theory. The move away from a continuous relationship between mixed
strategies and payoffs should broaden the scope of evolutionary game theory.
Second, with extensive form games, the relationship between mixed strate-
gies and behaviour strategies can be seen in a new light. Behaviour strategies
are difficult to work with because they lack the multilinear relationship be-
tween the strategies and payoffs. Mixed strategies are difficult to work with
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because the dimension of the strategy space is much higher than with be-
haviour strategies. The translation between behaviour strategies and mixed
strategies, accomplished by Kuhn (1953), allowed one to go between a strate-
gic structure that was easier to comprehend (behaviour strateges) and one
for which a Nash equilibrium exists (mixed strategies). But with myopic
equilibria and the spanning property, one can prove the existence of Nash
equilibrium entirely through the behaviour strategies.
Third, we can understand what is a subgame in a new way. Subgames are
linked closely to the concept of common knowledge, that the players know in
common that they have landed in the subgame. A problem arises if the subset
of starting points is not a single point; a single subgame is not defined, rather
a collection of subgame parametrized by the probability distributions on the
starting points of this subset. But with the spanning property and myopic
equilibria applied to this parametrization, we can understand a plurality of
starting points as a kind of subgame.
Fourth, we can prove the existence of equilibria for some new forms of
games through induction, using the conservation of the spanning property in
the relationship between the strategies, payoffs, and equilibria.
The following example demonstrates some of the uses of our theory.
Example 1:
Consider the following game of three players. Player One chooses between
two states, X and Y and Players Two and Three are not informed of the
outcome of this choice. Then Players Two and Three play a simultaneous
move zero-sum game between each other (so that this game is equivalent to
a simultaneous move three person game). Player Two has the actions L and
R and Player Three has the actions l and r. The payoff matrices for Players
Two and Three are the following:
State X
l r
L 9 1
R 1 1
State Y
l r
L 1 1
R 1 9
where the entries in the matrices represent the payoffs that Player Three must
pay to Player Two. Player One gets a payoff of 0 for all combinations except
for R and l in State X and L and r in State Y . For the Rl combination in
State X she gets 1+s for some very small s > 0 and in State Y she gets 1 for
the Lr combination. What are the Nash equilibria of this game and how does
it relate to myopic equilibria and a parametrized collection of subgames?
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We start with the strategies for Player One. Let p ∈ [0, 1] be the probabil-
ity for choosing the state X . Assuming that Players Two and Three know
this probability p, (though not assumed mathematically in the definition of
an equilibrium, this can be assumed in its application), their choices are in-
formed by the payoff matrix created by the mixture of p times the matrix for
State X plus 1− p times the matrix for State Y :
β 1− β
α 8p+ 1 1
1− α 1 9− 8p
– for the sake of analysis we added α and β, β for the probability that Player
Three will choose l and α for the probability that Player Two will choose L.
If p lies in the interior (0, 1) there are no optimal pure strategies for either
player. Assuming indifference between the two actions, we get the formulas
(1 + 8p)β + 1− β = β + (1− β)(9− 8p) and
(1 + 8p)α+ 1− α = α+ (1− α)(9− 8p),
which are symmetric in β and α and solve to β = α = 1 − p. Now consider
Player One’s payoff. Her choice for X results in a payoff of (1+ s)β(1−α) =
(1 + s)(1− p)p. Her choice for Y results in a payoff of α(1 − β) = (1− p)p.
As long as p is not equal to either 0 or 1, the choice for X is superior. It
follows that there are two types of equilibria in the three player game. In
one type, Player One chooses X with certainty, Player Three chooses r with
certainty, and Player Two chooses any value for α. In the other type, Player
One chooses Y with certainty, Player Three chooses l with certainty, and
Player Two chooses any value for α. In both cases Player One receives a
payoff of 0. Note however that if s = 0 then all values for p can be combined
with the appropriate above strategies for players Two and Three to define
Nash equilibria of the three player game.
Now lets think of this situation as a one player game in which Player One
chooses some p ∈ [0, 1] (representing the probability for X) and what follows
is no longer part of that game but nevertheless the payoff to Player One must
correspond to what the other players would do in equilibrium. The choice for
X , given p, gives a payoff of (1+s)(1−p)p. The choice for Y , given p, gives a
payoff of (1−p)p. This means that the choice for p yields an expected payoff
of f(p) := (1 + s)(1− p)p2 + (1− p)2p. To optimize the payoff we must take
the derivative f ′(p) = 1+ (2s− 2)p− 3sp2 and set it to zero, which solves to
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p = s−1+
√
1+s+s2
3s
. For s very small the solution calls for p very close to 1
2
, with
an expected payoff very close to 1
4
. Finding the Nash equilibrium of a one
player game is a problem of optimization and as long as the payoff function
is continuous there will be at least one optimal strategy, and if the payoff
function is strictly concave there will be a unique optimal strategy. Indeed
the payoff function of this game is strictly concave, as the second derivative of
f is 2s−2−6sp, which is always negative as long as s is less than 2. However
the concept of Nash equilibrium is not the right one for understanding the
three person game broken into two parts, the first part being that of Player
One’s choice and the second part collection of games between Players Two
and Three. It corresponds to the situation where Player One can commit
herself to a mixed strategy and maximizes the payoff accordingly. But what
if Player One “takes back control” to choose the action giving the highest
payoff? By doing so she will destroy the equilibrium property of the one
player game and after it is re-established through the myopic equilibrium
concept she will have a worse payoff, though one relevant to the three player
game. This has similarity to the myth of Odysseus and the Sirens, where
Odysseus optimizes by binding himself.
Conventionally the game played between Players Two and Three is not con-
sidered a subgame because it does not involve common knowledge of a single
state, even though the players do know in common that their choices pertain
to a subset of size two. This “subgame” is really a continuum of subgames,
one for each probability distribution on this subset of size 2.
We generalize the concept of subgame to subsets of vertices in a game tree
known in common, and call it a subgame bundle. These subsets are closed
with respect to actions and the knowledge of the players. Some requirement
of common knowledge is needed on the subsets that can define a subgame
bundle, because otherwise a player could be forced to play the same in two
locations belonging to different subgames.
A problem with generalizing the concept of a subgame to subsets is that
the set of equilibria, as a function of the probability distributions on the
subset of starting positions, in general cannot be approximated by continuous
functions. The above Example 1 used a zero-sum game played between the
remaining players, whose equilibria as a function of distributions will be an
upper-semi-continous and non-empty convex valued corrspondence. However
in the more general context of non-zero-sum games the equlibrium payoff
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correspondence will not have this nice property.
We know from the Structure Theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) that
there will be a topological structure to the equilibrium correspondence, a
homotopic relation that implies the spanning property. There are two ad-
vantages to working with the spanning property over the homotopic property
of Kohlberg and Mertens. First the spanning property is more general. With
repeated games of incomplete information on one side the equilibrium payoff
correspondence as a function of the probability distributions has the spanning
property (Simon, Spiez˙, Torun´czyk 2002), but there is no reason to believe
that it has the homotopic property. Second, there is no indication yet that
the homotopic property is robust with respect to composition, though we
prove that the spanning property has such a robustness.
The myopic equilibrium concept is not entirely new. The mathematical struc-
ture behind a myopic equilibrium is identical to that of a “Nash equilibria
of population densities” from evolutionary game theory. Though the mathe-
matical formalities are the same, the concepts are very different. With evolu-
tionary game theory, there is a continuum of animals belonging to a species.
Each species has a variety of types and a distribution of types is equivalent
mathematically to a mixed strategy. What we call a myopic equilibrium is in
the context of evolutionary game theory a kind of Nash equilibrium because
each individual animal seeks to maximize a utility independent of the species
as a whole. The distribution of types will influence the payoffs for each type,
and that introduces a potentially non-affine structure to those payoffs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section we pro-
vide the necessary topological apparatus and prove new results about the
spanning property, giving conditions under which it is preserved by opera-
tions on correspondences like taking intersections, taking cartesian products
or taking weighted sums. In the third section we define “game bushes”,
“game bundles”, “subgame bushes”, and “subgame bundles” and use results
from §2 to show the robustness of the spanning property with respect to
myopic equilibria, that if the payoffs have the spanning property then the
equilibrium payoffs of the game bundle has the spanning property. In the
fourth section we consider subgames, factor games, and a new concept of
subgame perfection. Finally we consider related questions and problems.
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2 The spanning property of correspondences
Let X and Y be metrizable spaces. By a correspondence F : X → Y we
mean here any compact subset of X × Y . Hence the same correspondence
may also be denoted as F ⊂ X × Y and we often switch from one notation
to the other; however, the use of F : X → Y displays the asymmetric role
which X and Y play below. Given such an F and a subset W of X we call
F ∩ (W × Y ) the restriction of F : X → Y to W and denote it F |W . The
image of F |W under the projection to Y is denoted by F (W ). We also write
F (x) := F ({x}) for x ∈ X and dom(F ) := {x ∈ X : F (x) 6= ∅}, the domain
of F . The usual challenge we encounter is to show that a given point x ∈ X
is in dom(F ), i.e, that F (x) 6= ∅.
It is convenient to note that if F : X → Y and G : Y → Z are cor-
respondences, then the formula H(x) = G(F (x)) defines a correspondence,
i.e.,
⋃
x∈X{x} ×H(x) is a compact subset of X × Z. We write G ◦ F for H .
Until Theorem 1 below we let M be a compact, connected d-manifold with
boundary δM (possibly empty) and W be a compact subset of M . By δW
we denote the boundary of the interior of W with respect to M . Important
to us is that there exists a well-defined element of the Cˇech homology group
Hd(W, δW ;Z2), denoted here by [W ], with the following properties:
Fact 1. a) If W is a compact, connected d–manifold then [W ] is the Z2–
fundamental class of W , the unique non-zero element of the Cˇech homology
group Hd(W, δW ;Z2).
b) With ∂[W ] ∈ H(δW ;Z2) standing for the image of [W ] under the
boundary operator, one has that the image of ∂[W ] in H(W \ {w};Z2) under
the inclusion–induced map is non-zero, for each point w in the interior of W .
A proof with M a sphere is given in (Simon, Spiez˙, Torun´czyk 2002);
using the orientablity of M over Z2 a generalization causes no difficulty. Of
course, [W ] depends on the ambient manifold M , e.g. it is null when W is a
disk embedded in the sphere S3, but non-null if this disk is being considered
as a subset of S2.
We say that a correspondence F : W → Y has property S if [W ] lies
in the image of the projection–induced homomorphism H(F, F |δW ;Z2) →
H(W, δW ;Z2) of the relative Cˇech homology groups with Z2–coefficients.
If F is given as, say, F ⊂ W × Y1 × Y2 and we wish to consider it as a
correspondence from W to Y1 × Y2 (rather than e.g. from Y1 to W × Y2),
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then above we say that F has property S forW , and similarly when there are
more or two factors. Here, S is an abbreviation for ”spanning”, addressing
to Fact 2a) below:
Fact 2. a) If F :W → Y has property S then the domain of F contains the
closure of the interior of W relative to the ambient manifold M .
b) If W ′ ⊂W are compact subsets of M and F :W → Y has property S
then F |W ′ hast it either.
c) Let W and W ′ be compact subsets of M and let correspondences F :
W → Y and F ′ : W ′ → Y coincide on W ∩ W ′. If F ′ takes values in
singletons only, then F ∪ F ′ has property S for W ∪W ′.
d) Suppose a correspondence F : W → Y is such that for each neighbour-
hood U of δW in M and each neighborhood V of F in W × Y there exists a
compact set G ⊂ V with property S for a compact set D satisfying δD ⊂ U
and D ⊂ W ∪ U . Then, F has property S for W .
Claim a) above follows from Fact 1b), and for the other ones see (Simon,
Spiez˙, Torun´czyk 2002) (again, with M a sphere).
Theorem 1. Let W,X, Y be compact manifolds and F,G ⊂ W × X × Y
be correspondences with property S for W ×X and for W × Y , respectively,
such that the projections F → Y and G → X are null–homotopic. Then,
F ∩G has property S for W .
Proof. 1). Let’s first assume none of W,X, Y has a boundary. Let α ∈ H(F )
be a homology class mapped to [W ×X ] under the homomorphism induced
by the projection to W ×X . The projection of F to Y being homotopic to a
constant (say, yo) one has α = [W ×X ×{yo}] in H(W ×X×Y ) – by which
we mean that the images of these two classes under the inclusion-induced
homomorphisms coincide.
Similarly, there exists a class β ∈ H(G) mapped to [W × Y ] under the
homomorphism induced by the projection of G to W × Y and such that for
some xo ∈ X one has β = [W × {xo} × Y ] in H(W ×X × Y ).
Below, we’ll be using the properties of the ”intersection pairing” described
in (Dold, 1972, §VIII.13). So, there is a well-defined element α•β ofH(F∩G).
In H(W×X×Y ) this element is equal to [W×X×{yo}]• [W×{xo}×Y ], by
what said earlier. The last product is however equal to [W × {(xo, yo)}], for
the manifolds X×{yo} and {xo}×Y intersect transversally at (xo, yo). And
since [W × {(xo, yo)}] is mapped to [W ] under the homomorphism induced
by the projection to W , so is α • β. Thus F ∩G has property S for W .
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2). Let now δW = ∅ and δY 6= ∅. We then consider Y as a subset of
Y˜ := Y ∪δY Y
′, a union of two copies Y and Y ′ of Y intersecting along δY .
Let h be a homeomorphism of Y onto Y ′ which restricts to identity on ∂Y ,
and let G′ := (idW×X × h)(G) and G˜ := G ∪G′.
We first prove that G˜ has property S for W × Y˜ . To this end we take
an α ∈ H(G,G|(W × δY )) which witnesses property S of G (i.e., is mapped
to [W × Y ] by the projection–induced homomorphism), set α′ := h∗(α) and
let α˜ ∈ H(G˜, G˜|(∂W × Y );Z2) be the image of α⊕ α
′ in the relative Mayer-
Vietoris sequence for (G˜, G˜|(∂W × Y )), (G˜′, G˜′|(∂W × Y ′)). We readily see
that ∂α˜ = 0, so α˜ can be considered as an element of H(G˜). Also, the
projection-induced homomorphism maps α˜ to the image of [W×Y ]⊕[W×Y ′]
under an analogous Mayer–Vietoris sequence, and this image is equal to
[W × Y˜ ]. This shows that G˜ indeed has property S for W × Y˜ . (We skipped
a technical point dealing with why are all the pairs involved excisive.)
Moreover, the projection of G˜ to X factors through the projection G →
X and hence is null-homotopic. The analogous property of the projection
F → Y˜ is even more obvious. Since δY˜ = ∅, if additionally δX = ∅ then
F ∩ G˜ has property S forW , by 1) above. However, F ∩ G˜ = F ∩G and thus
the assertion is true if δW = δX = ∅ (or if δW = δY = ∅, by symmetry).
3). The assertion also holds true if both X and Y do have a boundary
but W doesn’t. This is so because then the reasoning of 2) still applies
once the reference to 1) gets replaced by one to the conclusion of 2). (No
additional assumption on X is being made this time.)
4). Finally, if δW 6= ∅ then we replace W by W˜ := W ∪δW W , and F
and G by F˜ := F ◦ (q× idX×Y ) and G˜ := G ◦ (q× idX×Y ) respectively, where
q : W˜ → W is a retraction. As in 2) above we infer that F˜ has property S
for W˜ ×X and G˜ has it for W˜ × Y . Hence, the correspondence F˜ ∩ G˜ has
property S for W˜ , by 1) to 3) above. Since on W it restricts to F ∩G, the
desired conclusion follows from Fact 2b). 
Addendum to Theorem 1.The conclusion of Theorem 1 holds also true
if X and Y are as before andW is any compact subset of a compact, connected
ambient manifold M that is PL or is of dimension neither 4 nor 5.
Proof. The interior ofW is the union of an increasing sequence (Wn) of com-
pact manifolds with boundaries; see (Kirby and Siebenmann (1977), p. 108).
By Theorem 1 and Fact 2b), for each n the appropriate restriction of F ∩G
has property S for Wn, whence Fact 2d) applies. 
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Theorem 2. Let W,X, Y be as in Theorem 1 or in the Addendum to it.
Furthemore, let Φ : W → X and Ψ : X → Y be correspondences with
property S such that the projections Φ→ X and Ψ→ Y are null–homotopic.
Then, Ψ ◦ Φ : W → Y has property S.
Proof. Let F := Φ × Y and G := W × Ψ. Then F,G ⊂ W × X × Y are
correspondences with property S for W × Y and for W × X , respectively,
and such that the projections F → X and G→ Y are null–homotopic.
We have F ∩ G = {(w, x, y) | w ∈ W,x ∈ Φ(w), y ∈ Ψ(x)} and the
projection of F ∩ G to W is equal to the projection of F ∩ G along X to
Ψ ∩ Φ, followed by the projection of Ψ ∩ Φ to W . Since F ∩G has property
S for W (by Theorem 1 and the Addendum), so does Ψ ∩ Φ. 
Remark. The assumption in Theorems 1 and 2 that the corresponding
maps be null-homotopic (i.e., homotopic to constant ones) is automatically
satisfied if X and Y are simplices, as in the applications in §3 and §4 below.
Theorem 3. Let W be a compact top–dimensional subset of a PL-manifold
and Fi : W → Yi (i = 1, . . . , l) be correspondences with property S. Then,
this property is also enjoyed by the correspondence F : W →
∏
i Yi , defined
by the formula F (x) =
∏
i Fi(x).
Proof. We may assume all the Yi’s to be normed linear spaces (for they can
be embedded into such). For each i let Vi be an open neighborhood of Fi in
X ×Yi. We assume this neighbourhood is triangulated consistently with the
PL-structure ofW×prodiYi. By the spanning property of Fi, for d = dim(W )
there exists a d–chain zi in Vi, with boundary in δW × Yi and such that its
class is mapped to [W ] by the projection–induced homomorphism.
By general position we may assume that with respect to some triangula-
tion T ofW each d-simplex of zi projects injectively onto some simplex of T .
For each tuple (σ1, . . . , σl) of d-simplexes σi ∈ zi which project onto the
same simplex of T we define a ”diagonal” k-simplex in X ×
∏
i Yi by :
∆(σ1, . . . , σl) := {(x, y1, . . . , yl) | (x, yi) ∈ σi for each i } .
Then, we let z denote the chain inX×
∏
i Vi which is the sum of ∆(σ1, . . . , σl)’s
over all tuples (σi)
l
i=1 as above. One can observe that z is a d-chain in
(W, ∂W ) ×
∏
i Vi and its class is mapped to [W ] by the projection–induced
homomorphism . Thus, F has the spanning property by Fact 2d). 
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Corollary 1. In Theorem 3 assume that Yi = R
A for each i, where A is
a finite set. Then,
∑
i Fi : W → R
A defined by the formula (
∑
i Fi)(x) =
{y1 + · · ·+ yl | yi ∈ Fi(x) for all i} is a correspondence with property S.
Proof. Let Y ⊂ (RA)l be a closed ball containing F (W ), where F (x) =∏
i Fi(x) ⊂ (R
A)l for x ∈ W . Obviously,
∑
i Fi = f ◦ F , where f(y) =
∑
i yi
for y = (yi)
l
i=1 ∈ Y . Hence, it remains to apply Theorems 2 and 3. 
Given F ⊂ X × RA and a function λ : X → R we define λF ⊂ X × RA by
the formula:
(λF )(x) = {λ(x)y : y ∈ F (x)} for x ∈ X.
Corollary 2. Let W be a compact PL–manifold and for i = 1, 2, . . . , l let it
be given a continuous function λi :W → R, a function fi : W → Yi which is
continuous off λ−1i (0), and a correspondence Gi : Yi → R
A with property S.
Then the correspondence
∑
i λi(Gi ◦ fi) has property S.
Proof. By Corollary 1 it suffices to consider the case where l = 1; we hence
write λ, f and G for λ1, f1 and G1, respectively. We may assume that λ 6= 0,
say sup |λ|(W ) > 1. With Kn := {x ∈ X | |λ(x)| > 1/n} it follows from
Theorem 2 and Fact 2b) that G ◦ f |Kn has property S, whence Hn :=
λG ◦ f |Kn has it either. Let K and H denote the closures of
⋃
nKn and of⋃
nHn, respectively. Using boundedness of G(W ) we note that H is compact
and H = (λG◦f)|K; also, from Fact 2d) we infer easily that H has property
S. Moreover (λG◦f)(x) = {0} for x off the interior of K and so the property
S of λG follows from Fact 2c). 
For the last results of this section we introduce notation which is relevant
also to the further sections. That is, if A is a finite set then we let ∆(A)
denote the (|A| − 1)–simplex spanned by A:
∆(A) := {f : A→ [0, 1] |
∑
a∈A
f(a) = 1}
and we consider it being embedded in the |A|–space RA of all functions from
A to R, equipped with the norm ‖f‖ := (
∑
a |f(a)|
2)1/2.
Now, (Ai)i∈N be a partition of A into non-empty subsets. Corresponding
to it we let ∆ :=
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai), considered as a subset of
∏
i∈N R
Ai = RA. For
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a ∈ A and an element v of RA (and hence also for v ∈ ∆) we denote by va
the a-th coordinate of v.
Theorem 4. Let F : W × ∆ → RA be a correspondence with property S,
where W is compact manifold or is as in the Addendum to Theorem 1. Let
further D ⊂ ∆× RA denote the set of all pairs (σ, v) such that
for all i ∈ N and a ∈ Ai, if σ
a > 0 then va = max{vb : b ∈ Ai}. (1)
Then, F ∩ (W ×D) has property S for W .
Corollary 3. With W and F as above define E : W → RN by (w, r) ∈ E if
and only if for some (w, σ, v) ∈ F one has both (1) above and ri = maxa∈Ai v
a
for each i ∈ N . Then, E has property S.
Proof. Theorems 2 and 4 do the job, because E = f ◦ (F ∩ (W ×D)) where
f : RA → RN is defined by the formula f(v) = (max{va | a ∈ Ai})i∈N . 
Proof of Theorem 4. Let G denote the closure of D in ∆ × S, where S is
the sphere RA ∪{∞}. By Theorem 1 and its Addendum, combined with the
contractibility of ∆ and of RA, it suffices to prove that G has property S for S.
To this end let us recall that there exists a retraction r : RA → ∆ such
that, for σ ∈ ∆ and v ∈ RA, condition (1) holds true if and only if r(σ+v) =
σ. (See (Simon, Spiez˙, Torun´czyk (2020), Lemma 1). This r is the product of
nearest–point retractions ri : R
Ai → ∆(Ai), i ∈ N .) The formulas φ(σ, v) =
σ+ v and ψ(v) = (r(v), v− r(v)) hence define mutually inverse mappings ψ :
R
A → D and φ : D → RA. It follows that φ : D → RA is a homeomorphism
which is at finite distance from the projection (σ, v) 7→ v. The straight-line
homotopy between these two mappings is thus proper, and accordingly the
projection p : D ∪ {∞} → S is homotopic to the homeomorphism φ∪ id{∞}.
However, the projection of G to S is equal to the composition p◦q, where
q : G → D ∪ {∞} is a map that squeezes the set G∞ := G ∩ (∆ × {∞})
to {∞} and is the identity elsewhere. It is readily seen that G∞ = ∆×{∞},
whence q induces a homology–isomorphism by Vietoris’ theorem. Since so
did p, also p ◦ q induces such an isomorphism. 
3 Game bushes
We have to modify the concept of a finite game tree so that the terminal
points of the game contain variable payoffs and also there could be a variety
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of locations where the game starts. Without first stipulating the payoffs,
we call this modification a game bush. Some may prefer the term “game
forest”. But our structure involves an informational interaction between
the different starting points (roots) and terminal points (leaves); it is not
merely an independent collection of games. After we add a payoff structure,
it becomes a “game bundle”. In Simon, Spiez˙, and Torun´czyk (2020) the
concept of a “truncated game tree” was introduced, a game tree with a unique
starting point and an informational structure to the terminal points. However
we prefer a “game bush” to a “truncated game bundle” and prefer a “subgame
bush” to a “truncated subgame bundle”. Except for the terminology, the
concepts follow in parallel those of that article.
Let there be a finite set N of players. There is a finite directed graph (V, V )
(arrows between vertices) such that the directed graph is acyclic without the
orientation of the edges (meaning that for every vertex there is only one path
leading to that vertex from the roots. The subset R of initial vertices is called
the roots. T is the set of terminal points and every path of arrows starts at
a root and ends at a terminal point, with each terminal point determining
a unique such path of arrows. We allow T and R to have a non-empty
intersection, meaning that in part of the game bush the game could start
and end simultaneously. The set D of nodes is the subset V \T and these
are the vertices (except for the roots) to which comes exactly one arrow and
from which, without loss of generality, come at least two arrows. Toward a
root, there is no arrow, and from a root comes at least two arrows.
For each player n ∈ N there is a subset Dn ⊆ D such that ∀i 6= n Di∩Dn = ∅.
Define D0 to be the set D\(∪n∈NDn). Also for every n ∈ N there is a
partition Pn of Dn. For every W ∈ Pn there is a set of actions A
n
W such that
there is a bijective relationship between AnW and the arrows leaving every
v ∈ W . For every v ∈ D0 there is a probability distribution pv on the arrows
leaving the node v, and therefore also on the nodes following directly after
v in the tree. We assume without loss of generality that pv gives positive
probability to every arrow leaving v. The subset D0 is where Nature makes
a choice. Nature is not a player because it has no payoffs and its actions are
involuntary and randomized rather than choices in the usual sense.
At any node v ∈ W ∈ Pn only the player n is making any decision, and
this decision determines completely which vertex follows v. At the nodes v
in V0 nature is making a random choice, according to pv, concerning which
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vertex follows v. If the game is at the node v ∈ Dn and v ∈ W ∈ Pn then
Player n is informed that the node is in the set W and that player has no
additional information, so that insideW player n cannot distinguish between
nodes within W . A set W ∈ Pn is called an information set of Player n.
The inspiration behind its definition is that a game bush could be part of a
larger game, either at the start, the end, or in the middle. With conventional
game trees, there is only one root. The introduction of multiple roots creates
new problems. As a game bush could represent a kind of subgame, informa-
tion may be inherited from previous play. Therefore for each player n ∈ N
we require that there is a partition Rn of the roots R representing what each
player knows at the start of the game bush. And then to define the payoffs
and potentially to connect the game bush to further play in subsequent game
bushes, we require for each player n ∈ N that there is a partition Qn of the
terminal points.
Now we extend the definition of a game bush to that of a game bundle.
Define Q to be the meet partition ∧n∈NQn, the unique finest partition such
that for every n ∈ N every member of Qn is contained in some member of
Q. For any C ∈ Q we assume there is a correspondence FC ⊆ ∆(C)×R
C×N
of continuation payoffs. The correspondences FC for all C ∈ Q together with
the game bush define a game bundle. The partition Q represents common
knowledge in the end ponts. We believe that the payoffs must be defined
by such a partition. A non-empty overlap of different subsets could create
an unresolvable ambiguity concerning what are the payoffs. And an overlap
between an information set and a set defining the subgame would create
problems for the subgame concept.
A game bundle is not a single game, rather a collection of games parametrized
by the distributions on the set R of roots. Furthermore, because the payoffs
are defined by correspondences, there could be different payoff consequences
for the same set of actions and ending at the same terminal point (or indeed
none where the correspondence may be empty).
A game tree, the conventional game in extensive form, is a game bundle
such that the set R (of roots) is a singleton, Q is the discrete partition on
T (meaning the collection {{t}| t ∈ T}) and the correspondence Ft for every
t ∈ T is defined by a singleton {(δt, r)} for some payoff r ∈ R
N (where δr is
the Kroniker delta).
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For every player n ∈ N let Sn be the finite set of pure decision strategies of
the players in the game bush, by which we mean a function that decides, at
every set W in Pn deterministically which member of A
n
W should be chosen.
If each such AnW has cardinality l and there are k such sets in Pn then the
cardinality of Sn is l
k.
For our purposes, the set ∆ :=
∏
n∈N ∆(Sn) will be the set of strategies, what
are called the mixed strategies. A behaviour strategy is a choice of a point
in ∆(AnW ) for each choice of n ∈ N and W ∈ Pn. Later we will establish
new relations between these different types of strategies through subgame
bundles and myopic equilibria.
For every q ∈ ∆(R), σ ∈ ∆ :=
∏
n∈N ∆(Sn), and C ∈ Q let pq,σ(C) be the
probability of reaching C through σ and q ∈ ∆(R). If this probability is
positive, define Pq,σ(·|C) to be the conditional probability on C induced by
q and σ.
Given a game bundle with q ∈ ∆(R) and σ ∈ ∆ define a plan φ for (q, σ)
to be a choice of y ∈ RN×T such that yN×C ∈ FC(pq,σ(·|C)) if pq,σ(C) > 0
and otherwise yN×C ∈ FC(w) for some w ∈ ∆(C). As a priori the payoff
correspondence may fail to be a non-empty, there may be no plan.
Given a plan φ for (q, σ), a player n ∈ N and a choice s ∈ Sn define
fnφ (s) to be the expected value of y
n,e as determined by the q ∈ ∆(R) and
transitions determined by the s and the (σj | j 6= n), whereby the conditional
probabilities pq,σ are still determined by the entire σ = (σ
j | j ∈ N). A plan
φ for (q, σ) is an m-equilibrium if for all s ∈ Sn with σ
n(s) > 0 it follows
that fnφ (s) = maxt∈Sn f
n
φ (t). The payoff of a plan φ is a vector in R
N such
that the n coordinate is the expected value of of the fnφ (s), which for an
m-equilibrium is the common value for the fnφ (s) for all those s with positive
probability.
Next we show that the correspondence of m-equilibria has a certain special
property as long as the correspondences defining the continuation payoffs
have that same special property.
The next theorem applies to the context of a game bundle defined by a
partition Q and correspondences FC for every C ∈ Q.
Theorem 5. If for every C ∈ Q the correspondence FC ⊆ ∆(C) × R
C×N
has the spanning property then the correspondence defined by the payoffs of
m-equilibria has the spanning property with respect to ∆(R).
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Remark: We follow approximately a previous argument of Simon, Spiez˙,
and Torun´czyk (2020).
Proof: Let ǫ > 0 be given and let B be a positive quantity larger than any
payoff from the correspondences FC . If pq,σ(C), the probability of reaching
C with q and σ, is at least 2ǫ then define λq,σ(C) = 1. If pq,σ(C) ≤ ǫ then
λq,σ(C) = 0. And if ǫ < pq,σ(C) < 2ǫ then let λq,σ(C) =
pq,σ(C)−ǫ
ǫ
.
For every choice of ǫ > 0 and C ∈ Q define the correspondence Fǫ ⊆ ∆(R)×
∆ × RN×T by Fǫ(q, σ)N×C = λq,σFC(q, pq,σ(·|C) + (1 − λq,σ(C)){rB}, where
rB is the point whose entry is B for all choices. Due to Corollary 2 the
correspondence Fǫ has the spanning property. Due to Corollary 3 (with
∆(R) taking the role ofW in Corollary 3), the correspondence Gǫ defined by
the myopic equilibria from Fǫ plans has the spanning property. And because
the spanning property is defined using Cˇech homology, the cluster limit G of
the Gǫ for any sequence of ǫ going to zero also has the spanning property.
Now consider any payoff obtained fromG; we need to show that it comes from
an m-equilibrium. Suppose for a given (q, σ) that yN×A is from a sequence
of the Fǫ. As there are fixed values for the minimal non-zero probability for
reaching any terminal point e ∈ T , and the sequence of ǫ went to zero, it
follows for any C ∈ Q given positive probability by q and σ that λ < 1 was
not used in the definition of the payoffs in Gǫ for some sufficiently small ǫ.
And if C ∈ Q is given zero probability by the q and σ, due to the large
positive B, any cluster of vectors from the correspondence FC can be used
for the event that some terminal point in C is reached (and if there is no
such cluster, meaning that eventually only B was used in the definition of the
Gǫ, then any vecctor from FC would do). Given the inequalities defining the
myopic equilibria of G, after removing the use of B those inequalities remain
to show that G is a subset of the myopic equilibria of the game bundle. 
4 Subgames and factor games
We extend the definition of a subgame from that defined on a single state to
one defined on a subset of possible states.
Definition: A subset S of the vertices V of a game bush defines a subgame
bush on the vertices S if and only if
(1) one cannot leave S through any choice of action of a player or a choice
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of nature (meaning closure by arrows),
(2) for every player n ∈ N and every W ∈ Pn or W ∈ Qn either W is
contained in S or is disjoint from S.
At first the condition with Qn may seem unnecessary. But if we dropped this
condition then every subset of T would define a subgame bush. That would
create a problem if the game bush is followed by further play.
If the vertices S define a subgame bush, let R′ be the roots of the subgame
bush (the vertices in S that are in R or whose predecessor is not in S) and
T ′ is the subset of terminal vertices T ′ = T ∩ S. The partitions Q′n of T
′ are
defined by Q′n = {F ∩ S | F ∈ Qn} which by the definition of a subgame
bush are equal to {F | F ∈ Qn, F ⊆ T
′}. Likewise define Q′ to be the meet
partition ∧n∈NQ′n. The partition R
′
n of R
′ is defined by u, v belonging to the
same member of R′n if and only if u and v share the same last member of Pn
in the paths to u and v, and otherwise, if no such member of Pn exists, they
share the same member of Rn in the paths to u and v.
Given that additionally a game bundle Γ is defined, meaning with correspon-
dences FC for every C ∈ Q, another game bundle is defined by the subgame
bush defined by S and the same correspondences FC for the sets C ∈ Q,
since Q′ is just a subset of Q. The resulting subgame game bundle we call
Γ|S, and we see that it is also a game bundle.
Notice that it is possible for a set S defining a subgame bush to have a non-
empty intersection with the roots R. When this happens, the roots R′ of the
subgame bush have a non-empty intersection with R. Also it is possible for
R′ to have a non-empty intersection with T (and therefore also with T ′).
For every S that defines a subgame bush, we define also a factor game bush.
Its roots R′′ are the same as R and its partitions R′′n are the same as Rn.
Its terminal points T ′′ are defined to be T ′′ := (T\S) ∪ R′, where R′ are the
roots of the subgame bush defined by S. The partition Q′′n of T
′′ are defined
by {A |A ∈ Qn, A∩ S = ∅} ∪R
′
n, (where R
′
n is the partition on the roots of
the subgame bush). Because S is containing or disjoint from every member
of Qn, the definition of Q
′′
n is straightforward. We define Q
′′ to be ∧n∈NQ′′n.
Definition: A game bush has perfect recall for every player n if for every
v ∈ W ∈ Pn the member of Rn followed by the information sets in Pn
and actions taken by player n leading to v ∈ W has no repetitions and this
sequence is the same for every v ∈ W . The game bush has perfect recall if it
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is has perfect recall for every player.
Next we would like to define a factor game bundle. If C ∈ Q′′ ∩Q is disjoint
from S, we don’t change the payoff correspondence from the previous defini-
tion of FC . But we need to know what should be correspondence FC when
C ∈ Q′′ is a subset of R′, the roots of the subgame bundle. We would like
to say that C also defines a subgame bush, but unfortunately we cannot do
that without the assumption of perfect recall. It makes sense to define FC to
be some subset of the m-equilibria of the subgame bundle restricted to ∆(C)
as a subset of ∆(R′).
If a set S of vertices defines a subgame bundle then an m-equilibrium for
some q ∈ ∆(R) is S-perfect if restricted to the subgame bundle defined by
S it defines an m-equilibrium for some distribution on the roots R′ of S
such that when there is positive probability of reaching S that distribution
is the conditional probability as implied by the strategies and the initial
distribution q.
An m-equilibrium is subgame bundle perfect if it is S-perfect for all sub-
sets S of vertices that define subgame bundles.
Unless otherwise stated, for the factor game bundle Γ/S we define the
correspondence FC for every C ∈ Q
′′ with C ⊆ R′ to be the subgame bundle
perfect m-equilibria of the subgame Γ|S as restricted to ∆(C). If there is
some ambiguity concerning what should be FC , we can denote it by Γ
F/S,
where F stands for alternative corespondences.
Lemma 1. If the sets S and T define subgame bushes then their union S∪T
and their intersection S ∩ T also define subgame bushes.
Proof: It follows directly from the definition of subgame bushes as sets that
are closed with respect to information sets, partitions, and consequences of
actions. 
In general, it may be impossible for a player to combine her strategies from
Γ/S followed by ΓS in the way desired, as this player may not possess the
required memory to do this. If we assumed that these were two distinct
players, one playing in the factor game and a different one playing in the
subgame bundle, such a combination would not be problematic. But a player
performing in both the factor game and the subgame may fail to be capable
of performing the necessary mixed strategy in the subgame due to a lack of
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memory of what happened in the factor game. To go further, we need the
property of perfect recall.
Lemma 2: Let Γ be a game bundle, S a set defining the subgame bundle Γ|S
of G, with R′ the roots of the subgame defined by S. Assume that the game
bush of Γ has perfect recall. Let φ be an m-equilibrium of the factor game
Γ/S and q be its induced conditional probability on R′, the roots of S. The
plan φ combined with any m-equilibria of Γ|S corresponding to the conditional
probability q of R′ (with q equal to anything if the probability of reaching S
is zero) defines an m-equilibrium of Γ.
Proof: Let Sn1 and S
n
2 be the decision functions for Γ/S and ΓS respectively.
Let s1 be a member of S
n
1 and P an information set of Player n in the subgame
bundle ΓS that is reached with positive probability. If r is the expected payoff
for Player n from s2 conditioned on reaching P in the subgame bundle from
the strategies used in the factor game Γ/S, we need to know that r is also the
expected payoff from the combination of s1 with s2 conditioned on reaching
P . This follows from the property of perfect recall, because the distribution
on P from using s1 is not any different from the distribution on P used to
calculate the expected payoff r in the subgame bundle.
Theorem 6: If there is perfect recall, the correspondence of subgame bundle
perfect m-equilibria has the spanning property, meaning that for every intial
probability distribution on the roots there is a subgame bundle perfect m-
equilibrium.
Proof: The proof is by induction on the partially ordered structure of sub-
game bundles. If there are no subgame bundles, it is true by Theorem 1.
Otherwise let S be any subset of vertices defining a subgame. By induction
we assume that the correspondence of subgame bundle perfect m-equilibria
of both G|S and G/S have the spanning property. Let U be a set of vertices
defining a subgame. If U is contained in S, we have already assumed the
conclusion. If U is not contained in S, then by Lemma 1 G|U is a combina-
tion of G|U/S and G|U∩S. By Lemma 2 and Theorem 2 the subgame perfect
m-equilibria of G|U has the spanning property. 
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5 Further problems
The main advantage of mixed strategies over behaviour strategies is that one
can define the relationship between strategies and payoffs in a straightforward
way, through multi-dimensional matrices. However the dimensions of the
strategy spaces can become very large, and we would like to reduce these
dimensions.
Definition: An extensive form game is solvable if there is a sequence ∅ =
S0 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Sn = V such that for each game G|Si/Si−1 no player is called upon
to make a choice of action twice (meaning that there are no two P1, P2 ∈ Pn
such that P2 follows from P1 in some path).
In a solvable game, in each factor games G|Si/Si−1 there is no distinction
between behaviour strategies and pure strategies. Therefore one can under-
stand equilibria of the game entirely through behaviour strategies using the
above theorems. The question however is whether there is any computational
advantage won through this perspective. So far, the only clear advantage per-
tains to standard games of incomplete information on one side where a finite
game is followed by an infinitely repeated one, as is done in Simon, Spiez˙,
and Torun´czyk (2020). There we proved that there exists an equilibrium
and if the payoffs from both games come from the same matrices and the
payoff is a combination of the discounted and undiscounted, we showed that
ǫ-equilibria exist for every positive ǫ. With the above Theorem 5 one could
hope to improve this result to the existence of an equilibrium.
The following examples demonstrate some of the complexity of what is a
subgame and what constitutes subgame perfection.
Example 2:
There are two players. Player One has the choice between A for aggression
and P for passivity. If P is chosen the game moves to State X and the payoffs
are 1 for Player One and 2 for Player Two. If A was chosen the game moves
to State Y and Player Two has the choice between a for aggression and p for
passivity. If a is chosen the payoff is 0 for both players and if p is chosen the
payoff is 2 for Player One and 1 for Player Two.
There is an equilibrium where Player Two chooses a with certainty and Player
One choose P with certainty. Player One is afraid of getting 0, hence willing
to choose P . And because Player One chooses P with certainty, the “foolish-
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ness” of Player Two choosing a never upsets the equilibrium property. This
is the model of “mutually assured destruction”, that a player promises to
harm all players in the game and that threat works to keep that player from
ever confronting the situation where that threat must be carried out. On the
other hand the state Y defines a subgame whose only equilibrium involves
Player Two choosing p, hence also Player One choosing A, defining a second
and very different equilibrium. We recongnize the first equilibrium does not
induce an equilibrium of the subgame defined by the state Y , but the second
equilibrium does. The first equilibrium is subgame perfect, the second is not.
But before we discared the second equilibrium as irrelevant, notice that it
gives a superior payoff to Player One, the player who is performing the inte-
rior action in the subgame.
Example 3: Now we alter this game slightly so that Player Two cannot
distinguish between State X and State Y and has the actions a and p also in
State X and the payoff consequences of both a and p from State X are the
same as before, a payoff of 2 to Player One and 1 to Player Two. Conven-
tionally, this game has no subgames, so every equilibrium is subgame perfect.
In some way it is strategically equivalent to the previous game, as it can be
represented in normal form by the same matrix
p a
P (1, 2) (1, 2)
A (2, 1) (0, 0)
.
We perceive X and Y together as a subset defining a subgame bundle, with
a certainty that the play will reach this subgame bundle. Both equilibria dis-
covered in the previous example, A with p and P with a, induce equilibria of
the subgame bundle defined by the set {X, Y }. We introduced a new collec-
tion of subgames, and yet the A and p combination cannot be eliminated as
a subgame bundle perfect equilibrium. This shows that the subgame bundle
perfect concept is not determined exclusively by the normal, or matrix, form
of the game.
One would like a concept of subgame bundle perfection that incorporates
the most likely probability distribution on a subset C ∈ Q given that the
probability for C is zero. With probability theory, this question motivates
the concept of a random variable representing conditional probability with
the conditioned set has zero probability. However with games, especially if
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the game tree is finite, this question cannot be divorced from the related
question of who deviated to bring the play to this forbidden subset and why.
Unfortunately hitherto there is no good general answer to this question.
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